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Abstract 
 
The present thesis consists of six studies that investigate different cognitive factors 
that contribute to believing and unbelieving in paranormal, superstitious, magical, and 
supernatural (commonly referred to as paranormal belief). Earlier studies have found 
several factors reaching from personality factors to cognitive factors to cultural factors 
that contribute to believing. However, the research has neglected the important factor of 
what sets paranormal beliefs apart from other beliefs. In addition, although we know a 
lot about demographical and personality features that contribute to differences in 
paranormal beliefs, neuro-cognitive differences are still not well known or empirically 
tested.  
One explanation that takes into account the difference between paranormal beliefs 
and other beliefs is that paranormal beliefs stem from core knowledge confusions about 
the ontological properties of mental, physical, and biological phenomena. The first 
study of the thesis tried to gain insight into the neural basis of core knowledge 
confusions in an event-related electroencephalography study. The next two studies 
tested the possibility that cognitive inhibition, the ability to flexibly switch between 
thinking modes and if needed, to inhibit unwanted or irrelevant thoughts, could 
contribute to believing and unbelieving. In these two studies group differences between 
paranormal believers and skeptics were first compared by using tests of cognitive 
inhibition and secondly by using brain imaging. Brain imaging was done during a task 
that invoked paranormal interpretations. The last three studies of the thesis examined 
the role of the social information processing differences between paranormal believers 
and skeptics. Methods included brain imagining, behavioral experiments, and self-
report measurements. In the first study, we tested how conceptions about the mind are 
related to beliefs and core knowledge confusions. In the second and third of these 
studies, we tested group differences between paranormal believers and skeptics by using 
brain imaging and a behavioral test. We investigated if the groups differ in attribution of 
intentions to randomly moving objects and in tendency for illusory face perception. 
The results suggest that core knowledge confusions are based on intuitive world 
knowledge and that this intuitive world knowledge is less categorized among 
paranormal believers than among skeptics. Cognitive inhibition was also found to 
contribute to paranormal beliefs: strong cognitive inhibition downplays paranormal 
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beliefs. Social information processing was connected to paranormal beliefs in several 
ways. First, understanding mind and its properties in a Cartesian dualistic way was 
associated with paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions preceded them. Second, 
believers when compared to skeptics assigned more intentions to randomly moving 
objects. This was associated with activation of the mentalizing system at the brain level. 
Finally, we found out that paranormal believers were more prone to illusory face 
perception than skeptics were. The results underline that if one seeks to understand 
believing and especially unbelieving, which both are complex phenomena, individual 
differences in cognitive processing must be taken into account.  
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Tämä väitöskirja koostuu kuudesta tutkimuksesta. Näissä tutkimuksissa tarkastellaan 
erilaisten kognitiivisten tekijöiden vaikutusta siihen, uskooko ihminen yliluonnolliseen 
ilmiöihin vai ei. Aiemmissa tutkimuksissa on löydetty useita tekijöitä, jotka vaikuttavat 
uskomiseen tai uskomattomuuteen. Uskomiseen ja uskomattomuuteen vaikuttavat 
esimerkiksi persoonallisuuden ominaisuudet, kulttuuriset tekijät ja tietyt kognitiiviset 
tekijät. Nämä tutkimukset eivät kuitenkaan yleensä ole ottaneet kantaa olennaiseen 
kysymykseen: mikä erottaa yliluonnolliset uskomukset muista uskomuksista? Lisäksi 
kokonaisuudessaan yliluonnollisten uskomusten kognitiivisista tekijöistä tiedetään 
edelleen melko vähän, vaikka erilaisia osaselittäjiä ilmiölle on löytynyt.   
Yksi määritelmä, jolla yliluonnolliset ja taikauskoiset uskomukset eroavat muista 
uskomuksista on, että ne ovat erilaisia ydintiedon sekaannuksia. Toisin sanoen 
yliluonnollisissa uskomuksissa sekoitetaan keskenään psyykkisten, fysikaalisten ja 
biologisten olioiden perustavanlaatuisia ydinominaisuuksia ja juuri näiden 
ydinominaisuuksien sekoittaminen on määrittelevää yliluonnollisille uskomuksille 
suhteessa muihin uskomuksiin. 
 Väitöskirjan ensimmäisessä tutkimuksessa testattiin ydintiedon ominaisuuksien 
sekaannusten prosessoinnin aivokorrelaatteja aivosähkökäyrämittausta hyödyntäen. 
Seuraavissa kahdessa tutkimuksessa vertailtiin kognitiivisen inhibition vaikutusta 
taikauskoon skeptikkojen ja taikauskoisten välillä. Kognitiivinen inhibitio tarkoittaa 
kykyä muuttaa joustavasti ajattelutapoja ja ajattelun kohteita sekä kykyä työntää 
tarvittaessa asioita pois mielestä. Ryhmiä verrattiin ensin yleisesti käytetyillä 
kognitiivisen inhibition testeillä ja toisessa tutkimuksessa aivokuvantamista hyödyntäen 
tehtävässä, joka pyrki herättämään yliluonnollisia tulkintoja. Viimeisissä kolmessa 
tutkimuksessa tutkittiin sosiaalisen tiedonkäsittelyn eroja yliluonnolliseen uskovien ja 
skeptikkojen välillä kokeellisin menetelmin, aivokuvantamismenetelmin ja itse-
arviointikyselyin. Näistä ensimmäisessä testattiin miten käsitys mielen (ja sen 
prosessien) ja ruumiin yhteydestä (niin sanottu "mieli-ruumis-ongelma") on yhteydessä 
yliluonnollisiin uskomuksiin ja ydintiedon sekaannuksiin. Toisessa tutkimuksessa 
testattiin ryhmäeroja yliluonnolliseen uskovien ja skeptikkojen välillä tehtävällä, joka 
tehtiin aivokuvantamisen aikana. Tehtävässä tutkittiin tavoitteellisen ja tarkoituksellisen 
toiminnan näkemisessä satunnaisesti ja tarkoituksellisesti liikkuvissa kuvioissa. 
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Kolmannessa tutkimuksessa tutkittiin ryhmäeroja skeptikkojen ja taikauskoisten välillä 
herkkyydessä nähdä kasvoja erilaisissa esineissä ja luonnon muodostelemissa.  
Tulokset antavat tukea väitteelle, että ydintiedon sekaannukset perustuvat 
intuitiiviseen tietoon maailmasta ja että tähän liittyvä kategorinen tieto on heikommin 
rajautunutta taikauskoisilla kuin skeptikoilla. Kognitiivisen inhibition havaittiin olevan 
yhteydessä yliluonnollisiin ilmiöihin uskoviin siten, että tehokkaampi kognitiivinen 
inhibitio heikensi taikauskomuksia. Sosiaalisen tiedon käsittelyn osalta tulokset 
osoittivat, että taikauskoiset suhtautuvat mieleen ja sen ominaisuuksiin dualistisesti ja 
että tämä oli voimakkaasti yhteydessä taikauskoon. Dualistinen ajattelu voitiin myös 
tulosten valossa tulkita ydintiedon sekaannuksen muodoksi. Lisäksi taikauskoiset 
liittivät enemmän intentioita satunnaisesti liikkuviin kappaleisiin kuin skeptikot, ja tämä 
oli yhteydessä sosiaalista informaatiota käsittelevän aivoverkoston aktivaatioon 
aivotasolla. Taikauskoiset olivat myös alttiimpia huomaamaan kasvojen kaltaisia 
piirteitä erilaisissa esineissä ja luonnon muodostelemissa. Kokonaisuudessaan tulokset 
korostavat yksilöllisten kognitiivisten erojen huomioimista, kun monisyisiä ilmiöitä 
kuten yliluonnolliseen uskomista tai siihen uskomattomuutta yritetään selittää.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Imagine that someone close to you is sick and you are driven by worry. You are 
thinking about how the person is and wondering if you should call the person. Suddenly, 
the phone rings and it is the person you were thinking about on the phone. This is good, 
but was there a link between the thought and the phone call? Maybe for some, the idea 
that "Yes, there was a connection" came immediately, intuitively. And maybe for some, 
the idea came, but was instantly dismissed or inhibited, as it did not rationally or 
analytically make any sense. 
Most of us have experienced or at least heard about these kinds of situations. 
However, the explanations of what happens in these situations differ significantly 
among people. Some would say that the call was merely an odd coincidence. There was 
nothing special or unnatural in it because it is simply impossible that thoughts, a mental 
process, could have had an effect on the calling because mental processes can be only 
shared via physical mediators, such as vibrating air that the senses can interpret as 
speech, or by physical signs. On the contrary, some could say that this was not a 
coincidence. There was some sort of a link between the thought and the intention of the 
caller because sometimes thoughts can directly affect other people's thoughts. We just 
do not understand how this happens yet. In some sense, there could have been even 
something supernatural or paranormal in it. Maybe it was extra sensory perception. 
From a scientific point of view, belief in extra sensory perception or similar beliefs are 
not plausible and yet they are relatively common; for example, 41% of Americans 
believe in extrasensory perception (Gallup, 2005). In Finland, belief in extrasensory 
perception has slowly been declining: while in 2004 more than every third (36%) person 
believed in it, in 2013 every fourth (25%) believed in it (Tieteen tiedotus ry, 2013). As 
another example of the commonness of paranormal beliefs, in Europe only 18% of 
people agree with a statement that, "I don't believe there is any sort of spirit, God, or life 
force” in contrast to 52% who believe in God and 27% who believe in some sort of 
spirit or life force (European Commission, 2005).   
Cultural evolution and cultural learning are suggested to have important effects on 
commonality of religious supernatural beliefs (Gervais, Willard, Norenzayan, & 
Henrich, 2011). Historically, belief in the supernatural has been common, close to a 
norm, and although disbelief is nowadays more common than potentially any other time 
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of history, belief remains common. Thus, although there may have been a cultural 
transition, especially in the Western countries, that has made disbelief more culturally 
accessible than before, there is still large variation in the numbers of people who believe 
or do not believe. 
While cultural influences have effects on adopting beliefs, situational and contextual 
factors, such as stress or primed thoughts related to death, also modify the strength of 
supernatural beliefs (Keinan, 2002; Norenzayan & Hanse, 2006). People may also react 
differently in the same context and culture, showing that not only culture or situation, 
but also the subjective properties, such as information processing differences, interact 
with the context and culture. In other words, even though the macro cultural and 
situational effects are important in supernatural and paranormal beliefs, some people 
may have individual properties that make them more skeptical than others or contrary 
stronger believers than others. Thus, even though the cultural zeitgeist may explain 
general shifts in the number of believers and non-believers, it does not explain the 
existence of individual differences between believers and unbelievers who live in the 
same culture or act in the same contexts. Briefly, to fully understand why some people 
believe and others do not, we also have to understand how individual differences 
contribute to maintaining paranormal beliefs or rejecting them. This study focuses on 
some of the individual neuro-cognitive factors that may contribute to disbelief and 
believing in the supernatural and paranormal.  
Earlier studies have recognized several factors, such as demographics, education and 
personality factors that contribute to believing and unbelieving (see Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 
2014). Although several factors have been found, the found effect sizes have been 
modest and the results have sometimes been inconsistent. This hints that the 
phenomenon derives from multiple factors or that the questions asked to explain the 
phenomena have not been accurate enough.   
Cognitive factors associated with beliefs have also been studied. For example, the 
connection of general intelligence and paranormal beliefs is only weak and some studies 
have failed to find it (reviews: Wisemann & Watt, 2006; Vyse, 2014). It has also been 
tested to determine if paranormal beliefs stem from an inability to critically evaluate the 
beliefs (French & Wilson, 2007), but there is little empirical support for the claim. 
However, there is consistent evidence that paranormal believers perform worse than 
skeptics do in deductive reasoning (French & Wilson, 2007; Wisemann & Watt, 2006). 
There is also some, but inconsistent, evidence that paranormal beliefs are associated 
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with difficulty in engaging in probabilistic reasoning (review: Rogers, Davis, & Fisk, 
2009). Another cognitive factor that has been convincingly associated with paranormal 
beliefs is overactive pattern detection (French & Wilson, 2007; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). 
For example, paranormal believers favor false alarms over misses when searching for 
meaningful stimuli among noise (Krummenacher, Mohr, Haker, & Brugger, 2009). 
Thus, there have been some cognitive factors that have been connected to paranormal 
beliefs, but the overall picture is still not clear. For example, the domain specificity or 
generality of the pattern detection is not clear and the underlying cognitive factors 
leading to weak performance in deductive reasoning are not clear. In addition, little is 
known about the neural basis of these cognitive factors.  
Another cognitive factor that has been suggested to be important, especially in 
religious supernatural beliefs, is the way of understanding other minds and the way the 
social brain develops (e.g., Bloom, 2004). It has been suggested that the development of 
the social brain, by default, leads to some supernatural beliefs such as belief in a soul 
(Bering, 2006). However, these claims have been mostly theoretical and the few 
empirical studies have focused on such beliefs as believing in gods (e.g., Norenzayan, 
Gervais, & Trzesniewski, 2012) or believing in souls (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). Thus, 
these studies have commented little on the diverse paranormal beliefs outside religious 
beliefs and the empirical testing of factors contributing to belief and disbelief regarding 
the role of processing of social information has been scant.   
The present study explores cognitive and neural foundations that contribute to 
individual differences in why some believe in the paranormal and others do not. This 
thesis focuses on three aspects of individual differences. First, how are intuitive 
differences in world knowledge about mental, physical, and biological phenomena 
related to paranormal beliefs and are they measurable using brain research methods? 
Second, how does the monitoring and regulating of raising intuitions contribute to or 
hold back paranormal beliefs, and third, how do the individual differences in the social 
information processing, for example ability to understand abstract intentional minds, 
contribute to paranormal beliefs? 
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1.1 Paranormal, supernatural, magical, religious and 
superstitious beliefs are forms of ontological confusions  
 
Paranormal belief is a complicated concept to define and sometimes exactly the same 
beliefs have been studied under different names; for example, under the title of 
paranormal, superstitious, magical, or supernatural beliefs (reviews Irwin, 2009; Vyse, 
2014; for the conceptual basis for the present set of studies, see Lindeman & Svedholm, 
2012). This lack of clear definition of the topic of the research has led to miscellaneous 
operationalization and unnecessary heterogeneity in the concepts. Paranormal, 
superstitious, magical, or supernatural beliefs have often been categorized vaguely and 
been conceptualized simply as erroneous or scientifically impossible beliefs (e.g., 
Tobacyk & Milford, 1983; Beck & Forstmeier, 2007; Sharps, Matthews, & Asten, 
2006), magical beliefs (e.g., Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1986), overactive pattern 
perception (e.g., Wiseman & Watt, 2006), and associative or covariation biases (e.g., 
Gianotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehmann, & Brugger, 2001; Nemeroff & Rozin, 2000).  
Although these conceptualizations fit with paranormal beliefs, they also fit with 
beliefs that are not usually considered as paranormal or only cover specific types of 
paranormal beliefs. These conceptualizations are thus unable to answer the crucial 
question of what, if anything, separates paranormal beliefs from other beliefs. In other 
words, these conceptualizations do not answer what makes a paranormal belief in a 
ghost conceptually different from an erroneous non-paranormal belief that all birds can 
fly or why both, voodoo and ESP are considered as paranormal beliefs. The inability to 
conceptually separate paranormal beliefs from other beliefs questions the rationale to 
study them separately. Thus, when trying to explain what especially leads to 
supernatural, superstitious, paranormal, magical, and religious beliefs, a 
conceptualization that sets these beliefs apart from other non-paranormal, unfounded 
beliefs is needed.  
There is one common denominator that almost all beliefs considered paranormal, 
supernatural, superstitious, magical, and religious share and which sets them apart from 
other beliefs: they all include confusions regarding core ontological properties of mental 
phenomena, material objects, living, and animate organisms (Lindeman & Svedholm, 
2012; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007). Core ontological properties refers to fundamental 
attributes of evolutionary important phenomena that children learn universally and 
17 
 
easily such as independent existence and force for physical phenomena and living for 
biological phenomena (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994; Inagi & Hatano, 2004; Spelke & 
Kinzler, 2007; Wellman & Gelman, 1998). Another example of fundamental attributes 
that children learn to understand is that intentional acts are functions of animate beings 
and that physical events happen because of unintentional force. In addition, at the crux 
regarding ontological properties important for paranormal beliefs is the understanding 
that people have minds and inner mental states in forms of beliefs, desires, and 
intentions.  
In paranormal, supernatural, superstitious, magical, and religious beliefs these core 
ontological properties are often confused. For example, belief in psychokinesis means 
that a person can directly manipulate physical entities with mental thoughts. This would 
mean that a mental thought would have a physical property of mechanical force. 
Similarly, in out-of-body experiences the mental thoughts and consciousness would 
have a physical property of independent existence and ability to move in space. In 
addition, a similar belief in an immortal soul would mean that a mental process of 
consciousness would have in itself a biological quality of living and a physical quality 
of independent existence and an ability to move in time and space. In other words, 
mental phenomena would not be interdependent on any physical or biological processes. 
A similar, but less strict conceptualization than the one used in this thesis has emerged 
in the field of cognitive science of religion where religious supernatural beliefs are 
considered to be any kinds of ontological confusions, not limited to core ontological 
properties (e.g., Boyer, 2001; Atran & Norenzayan, 2004; for discussion of the relation 
of these conceptualizations, see Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012). Taken together, the 
common unifying theme at the heart of the content of paranormal, supernatural, 
superstitious, and magical beliefs are core ontological confusions. In other words, 
although the appearance or the phenotype of these beliefs are cultural dependent and 
may prominently vary, they all share the similarity of being different forms of 
ontological confusions.   
Though most of the beliefs share this common denominator of core ontological 
confusions, some beliefs often studied under paranormal beliefs do not. For example, 
belief in extraterrestrial life or UFOs is a plausible belief as long as the postulated aliens 
do not possess abilities or properties that violate core ontological categories. Thus, 
focusing on the common denominator, ontological violations allow an articulated 
conceptualization that specifies what makes a paranormal belief different from other 
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beliefs and what connects these different beliefs under a common label. This 
conceptualization also suggests that the trajectory and explanations for these beliefs 
may be different from other beliefs, such as common mistaken beliefs (e.g., dolphins are 
fishes) because these beliefs are related to core knowledge. Basing on this 
conceptualization, paranormal, supernatural, superstitious, and magical beliefs are 
together here after referred as paranormal beliefs.  
Although in the present thesis, the conceptualization of paranormal beliefs covers 
supernatural religious beliefs, it should be noted that even though religious beliefs such 
as belief in a god or gods, are also ontological confusions, these beliefs are not the same 
as religion or religiousness. Religion and religiousness are broader phenomena than 
supernatural religious beliefs alone. They also cover social, ritual, and institutional 
aspects outside mere beliefs. In addition, not all religious beliefs, for example a belief 
that you should not do harm or that you should respect your parents, are necessarily 
supernatural or paranormal. Thus, explaining religion or religious behavior covers 
features outside of explaining belief in paranormal beliefs: for example, how motivation 
affects participation in ritual behavior or how belonging to a religious institution affects 
wellbeing or behavior. These themes are left outside the scope of the current thesis. In 
this thesis, the focus is on individual neuro-cognitive factors that contribute to believing 
and unbelieving in the paranormal.  
 
1.2 Paranormal believers are prone to core knowledge 
confusions 
 
In childhood the domain-specific knowledge about psychological, physical, and 
biological is not fine-tuned and category mistakes are common, as already observed by 
Piaget (1929/1951). For example, children’s intuitive way of explaining physical 
phenomena in terms of psychological terms such as intentionality, has led to a 
suggestion that children are intuitively theists and bound to teleological reasoning that 
contributes to creationistic thinking and believing in a primus motor, creator god 
(Kelemen, 1999; 2004). In addition, because children treat the mind as independent 
from the body in a Cartesian, dualistic way, beliefs in spirits and souls without physical 
bodies are sensible (Bloom, 2004; 2007; Bering, 2006; Bering & Bjorklund, 2004). 
These children’s tendencies to fuse the categorical information have led to conclusions 
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that these universal intuitive biases function as a base for various paranormal beliefs. 
These studies link paranormal belief with early emerging intuitive biases, but they focus 
only on specific beliefs and do not comment on what separates the intuitively rising 
paranormal beliefs from other non-paranormal intuitive beliefs. They also do not 
comment on what leads to individual differences in adulthood.  
There is some empirical evidence that among adult paranormal believers ontological 
confusions are more common than among skeptics (Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; 
Lindeman & Saher, 2007). In these studies, the believers agreed more than skeptics did 
that sentences with core knowledge violations were literally true. Thus, more than 
skeptics, paranormal believers agree that a river literally wants to flow or that a thought 
can heal or physically damage. However, it is not clear why supernatural believers 
approve sentences with core knowledge violations more than skeptics do. 
According to dual-process theories, we have two reasoning systems or types of 
thinking, intuitive and analytic (for review see Evans, 2008). Intuitive processing is 
considered to be autonomous, fast, and not dependent on working memory while 
analytic thinking is considered to be slow, deliberate and dependent on working 
memory (Evans, 2012; Stanovich, & Toplak, 2012). These two processing types may 
produce conflicting results or be prone to different conceptions. For example, 
understanding the contagiousness of diseases may be done in both magical and 
biological terms (Legare & Gelman, 2008). Thus, although in adulthood explicit 
knowledge may challenge paranormal beliefs, intuitive knowledge may align with it in 
the form of confused core knowledge. It has even been proposed that paranormal beliefs 
may be latent and can re-emerge in adulthood if cognitive control of intuitive thinking is 
hindered (Hood, 2009), but so far it is not clear why the beliefs are more latent for some 
and less latent for others.  
It is possible that there are simply developmental differences that lead to differences 
in the intuitive categorical knowledge regarding psychological, psychic, and biological 
phenomena, which leads to looser categorical boundaries for paranormal believers than 
for skeptics. However, paranormal believers have also been found to rely more on 
intuitive thinking than skeptics (Epstein, 2010; King, Burton, Hicks, & Drigotas, 2007; 
Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Sadler-Smith, 2011). Thus, because paranormal believers 
trust their intuitions more than skeptics do, it is possible that the potentially confused 
intuitions affect believers’ more than unbelievers’ reasoning. For example, in the case of 
telekinesis, if believers’ intuitive knowledge about mental processes does not strictly 
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rule out the possibility that a mental process could possess physical power, the belief is 
alluring and deciding whether telekinesis is possible or not would be laborious. 
Adversely, if skeptics’ intuitive core knowledge about mental processes is stricter and 
trust in, sometimes confused, intuitions less than believers, skeptics may effortlessly 
exclude the entire possibility of telekinesis. This would not mean that the paranormal 
believers would claim that paranormal phenomena such as telekinesis occur all the time 
in everyday life because the explicit knowledge about life is against this claim. Rather, 
differences in intuitive core knowledge could keep the door open for such beliefs or 
would not exclude such beliefs categorically. On the other hand, for skeptics the door 
would be shut or almost shut and categories constricted. Thus, metaphorically speaking, 
closing the door during reasoning of what is possible and what is not would require 
more work for believers than for skeptics.  
 
1.3 Neural foundations of core knowledge confusions: intuitive 
world knowledge and N400  
 
Intuitive mental presentations, such as core knowledge, are challenging to study. One 
possible way to tap the intuitive world knowledge is by using electroencephalography 
(EEG) to measure brain’s event-related potential (ERP) N400 (Osterhout et al., 1997). 
The N400 is measurable in situations in which a word is anomalous in the context of the 
presented sentence (e.g., I take tea with sugar, milk, and a cat). Presentation of these 
kinds of anomalies elicits a negative ERP that is measurable from the scalp 
approximately 400ms after the anomalous word. The N400 is associated with 
processing of meaning and it is sensitive to expectations and contextual effects; 
furthermore, it can be elicited with various stimuli including not only written, spoken, 
and signed words, but also with pictures or objects (for review, see Kutas & Federmeier, 
2011).  
The N400 was traditionally only connected to language processing, but nowadays it 
is considered to be related to a general understanding of meaning and it can be 
effectively used to examine understanding of the meaning in language processing and 
semantic memory (Kutas & Federmeier, 2011). The suggestions that the N400 reflects 
meaning processing outside the literal meaning of language is supported by the findings 
that the N400 is sensitive to non-literal language processing such as metaphors that 
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capture meaning outside the semantic rules (for review, see Coulson, 2011). Generally, 
the more negative the N400 is, the less coherently the target word fits with the 
expectation and context that is created by the whole sentence and earlier knowledge. 
In paper I, we used an N400 ERP paradigm to test processing differences between 
paranormal believers and skeptics while they were deciding if sentences with core 
knowledge confusions were literally true or not. The aim of the study was to verify a 
conceptual definition of paranormal beliefs and to gain insight into the neural correlates 
of knowledge confusions. The possible benefit of using the N400 to measure core 
knowledge confusions is that, when subjects process language, they process not only 
semantic meaning, but also the meaning of the stimuli in relation to real world 
knowledge. Because the N400 has been found to reflect expectations that are based on 
the long-term memory regarding the phenomena that occur and what objects there are in 
real life, independent of semantic rules (Chwilla & Kolk, 2005; Federmeier, Kluender, 
& Kutas, 2002), it could also reflect differences in core knowledge. The effect of world 
knowledge has been shown in a study in which semantic anomalies and context 
anomalies were compared. When the N400 responses were compared in a context of 
“Dutch trains are ____ and very crowded,” the semantic anomaly “sour” elicited the 
same size N400 effect as the world knowledge violation “white,” which contrasts with 
the real world knowledge of Dutch people that Dutch trains are “yellow” (Haagort et al., 
2004). In these tasks, the more negative N400 effect is suggested to reflect longer 
retrieval of information from long-term memory. In the context of core knowledge 
confusions, this would mean that in deciding the literal truth of sentences with 
ontological confusions, less coherent core knowledge would lead to more laborious 
reasoning and to longer long-term memory retrieval times. Thus, in Paper I, we 
expected that when compared to skeptics, paranormal believers would exhibit more 
negative N400 to sentences with core knowledge confusions. 
 
1.4 Does cognitive inhibition suppress paranormal beliefs? 
 
Although the simplest explanation for the differences in processing sentences with core 
knowledge confusions between paranormal believers and skeptics might only be their 
qualitative difference in the coherence of the core knowledge, there may be other 
sources for the differences as well. One possible explanation, complementary or 
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independent, for the differences could be the ability to suppress intuitions that contradict 
analytic, explicit interpretations. In other words, if the intuitive word knowledge differs 
from explicit learned knowledge, there may be processes that suppress and diminish the 
intuitive interpretation.  
Analytic thinking is shown to diminish paranormal beliefs, at least to some extent 
(Gervais & Norenzayan, 2012; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006; Pennycook et al., 2012). 
However, how exactly the discrepancies between analytic and intuitive interpretations 
in reasoning interact, is currently under debate (see for example Bonner & Newell, 2010; 
De Neys, 2012; Evans, 2008; Stanovich, 2009a, 2009b). The main questions under 
debate are whether the intuitive and analytic processes simply compete with each other 
in a sense of "the stronger wins," or does a special mechanism regulate these thinking 
processes. One possible mechanism that could function as a suppressor of intuitive 
thinking, and hence intuitions contributing to paranormal beliefs is cognitive inhibition. 
Cognitive inhibition is a general term that refers to conscious or unconscious 
cognitive control involving suppressing, stopping or overriding cognitive processes. 
Cognitive inhibition has a high heuristic value as it is used in several fields of 
psychology, although the explanations and definitions of its nature differ. Generally, it 
is considered to be resource-dependent. In cognitive psychology and neuropsychology, 
cognitive inhibition may refer to an ability to inhibit responses and distractors or to 
inhibit irrelevant or unwanted thoughts (Friedman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Redick, 
Heitz, & Engle, 2007; Macleod, 2007). In social psychology the idea of controlling 
dominant responses and biases comes close to conceptions of cognitive inhibition 
although the research does not always comment on inhibition research in cognitive 
psychology (for a review, see Hagger, Wood, & Stiff, 2010).  
Neuroanatomically, brain imaging studies and lesion studies have associated 
inhibitory processing to the right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG). In tasks that require 
response inhibition, set shifting, or inhibiting thoughts, this area is usually activated and 
lesions in this area compromise success in these tasks (Andersson et al., 2004; 
Andersson & Levy, 2009; Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004; Aron, 2007; Munakata et 
al., 2011). There is also some in vivo neuro-cognitive evidence that disrupting normal 
right IFG functioning with repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation enhances 
intuitive biases in syllogistic reasoning (Tsujii, Masuda, Akiyama, & Watanabe, 2010). 
All these lines of research suggest that cognitive inhibition could be involved in 
paranormal beliefs because it tunes reasoning and contributes to the interplay of 
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intuitive and analytic processing. Importantly for the individual differences point of 
view of the current set of studies, the right IFG activations are also shown to be a source 
of individual differences in cognitive tasks that involve conflict adaptation and 
resolution (Egner, 2011).  
Hood (2009) has suggested that without the ability to adequately inhibit rising 
intuitions, people might be overwhelmed by a sense of the supernatural. In line with this 
argument, weaker inhibitory control has been associated with teleological biases 
(Kelemen & Rosset, 2009) and a tendency to make core knowledge confusions 
(Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013a). Interestingly, paranormal beliefs and cognitive 
inhibition also share other correlates. They are both associated with intuitive biases in 
logical reasoning, altered states of consciousness, creativity, and intuitive thinking 
(references in Papers II and III). In addition, during adulthood when cognitive inhibition 
is most efficient, supernatural beliefs are less common, and inversely, during childhood 
and old age when cognitive inhibition is least efficient, paranormal beliefs are more 
common (references in Paper II and III). To clarify the role of cognitive inhibition in 
paranormal beliefs, we compared cognitive inhibition between believers and skeptics in 
Paper II and Paper III.   
In Paper II, we used the Stroop color-word test (MacLeod, 1991; 2005) and 
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WSCT) (Demakis, 2003) to directly test whether 
paranormal believers have weaker inhibitory processing than skeptics have. We 
hypothesized that paranormal believers have weaker performance in the inhibition tests 
than skeptics. The Stroop test is mostly considered to reflect relatively low-level 
automatic perceptual and response stage processing when subjects try to inhibit 
automatic responses (Friendman & Miyake, 2004; Nigg, 2000; Redick, Heitz, & Engel, 
2007). The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Demakis, 2003), in turn, measures the ability 
to shift mental sets flexibly and avoid perseverative errors. The tendency to make 
perseverative errors is especially suggested to be connected to inhibitory problems.  
In Paper III, inhibition was assessed indirectly by measuring right IFG activation 
with functional magnetic resonance imagining (fMRI) during a task that evokes 
paranormal interpretations. We expected that when compared to skeptics, believers 
would have weaker activation of right IFG. This activation difference could reflect 
weak engagement in cognitive inhibition in the situation that allures paranormal 
interpretations.  
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1.5 Paranormal beliefs and the social brain: Understanding 
minds and paranormal agents 
 
During the last ten years, many cognitive scientists of religion have suggested that 
belief in supernatural, particularly religiosity, is a cognitive default and a by-product of 
the human evolution of cognition (e.g., Guthrie, 1993; Kelemen, 2004; Barret, 2000; 
Boyer, 2001; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007). The idea could be summarized as follows: 
because humans are able to form representations of immaterial minds and psychological 
processes and tend to treat their own minds as separate from their bodily functions, they 
are also able and prone to form representations of gods, spirits, and an afterlife. 
Human’s ability to understand minds could contribute to paranormal beliefs on several 
levels; for example, this ability could enable the formation of representations of 
supernatural beings and by seeing physical processes as intentionally caused by an 
agent. Thus, in these terms, a tsunami could be seen as a deliberate expression of anger 
towards the people who have disputed and angered a supernatural being. This intuitive 
ability to understand minds could make believing in paranormal concepts 
comprehensible and alluring. 
In the field of developmental psychology and neurosciences, human understanding of 
other minds, that other people act goal-directed and intentionally based on their wishes 
and beliefs is called theory of mind (ToM). The ToM begins to develop from birth and 
some social related habits and bases for later developing skills are innate (Farroni et al., 
2005; for reviews of ToM development, see Blakemore, 2008; Saxe, Carey, & 
Kanwisher, 2004; Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). The ToM is not one process but a 
bundle of processes. For example, perception of goal-direct movement does not 
necessarily involve further mentalizing, meaning that people do not necessarily form 
higher level presentations of inner mental states, such as beliefs or wishes, that 
potentially guide or are related to the goal-directed action. Thus, understanding that an 
agent tries to reach a goal does not necessitate understanding of the beliefs that underpin 
the goal reaching. This gradualness of ToM processing is also reflected as gradual 
development. By the first year, infants can ascribe agency to an entity and understand 
that an agent acts towards a goal. By 18 months, an infant’s joint attention skills and 
"pretend play" begin and serve as a base for more refined mentalizing skills such as 
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understanding false-beliefs and inner mental motives.  A child usually masters these 
abilities around four to five years of age.  
Although mentalizing develops and becomes refined gradually towards adulthood, 
mentalizing and other ToM skills are on a continuum that stems from both heritable 
variation and environmental inputs (Baron-Cohen, Knickmeyer, & Belmonte, 2005; 
Crespi & Badcock, 2008; Kanazawa, 2010; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990); even healthy 
adults may fail in tasks that require mentalizing of higher level intentions or perspective 
taking (Keysar, Lin, & Barr, 2003). Individuals who have serious disorders in these 
skills, that is, individuals with autism spectrum disorders, even more drastically 
evidence the variety and importance of the ToM skills. In autism spectrum disorders the 
problems with ToM skills are sometimes even characterized by the term "mind-
blindness" (Baron-Cohen, 1999; Frith, 2001). Thus, in adulthood, there seems to be 
individual differences in ToM processing and some of the differences are present in the 
general population.  
Even though ToM processing may serve as a base for paranormal beliefs as 
suggested by many researchers, these researchers have not usually commented on the 
individual differences in ToM processing and paranormal beliefs. For example the 
question of why skeptics with normal ToM processing do not believe in paranormal has 
not been fully addressed. One possible explanation that aligns with the present 
definition of paranormal beliefs could be that what separates believers and skeptics who 
both have normal ToM is how the properties of mind are understood at the core level. In 
other words, how is the input from the ToM system intuitively and explicitly understood 
and interpreted? The last three studies of the present study explored this and other 
differences between the believers and skeptics in ToM-related information processing.   
 
1.6 Paranormal beliefs and the social brain: Dualism and the 
mind without the body 
 
Bloom (2004) argues that because of human’s intuitive understanding of physical and 
mental phenomena is based on different rules and systems, they are prone to treat mind 
and body as separate entities. This in turn leads to dualistic thinking about how mind 
and body are associated, or to put it in scientific terms, to a dualistic view about the 
mind-body problem. However, even though dualistic beliefs are dominant in childhood 
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(e.g., Bjorklund & Bering, 2004) and remain relatively common in adulthood (Demertzi, 
et al., 2009; Fahrenberg & Cheetham, 2000; 2007; Stanovic; 1989), there are still many 
people who do consider the mind as either interdependent or the same as the body (i.e., 
brain and its functions). One possible explanation for the different views of mind-body 
relations could be that skeptics’ core conception of physical and mental phenomena is 
different from that of paranormal believers. In other words, believers' core knowledge is 
looser and remains closer to the developmentally initial idea of mind-body dualism, that 
the mind is fully independent or materially different from physical matter and the body.  
In terms of core knowledge confusions, this would mean that a mental phenomenon 
would have biological and physical properties of living and physical existence in space. 
In contrast, a skeptics' view could be that mental phenomena are either the same or at 
least interdependent on the physical brain and not living per se. Thus, even if mental 
processes may feel as if they are independent, they are, at the core, interdependent on 
the brain and body. Therefore, the different conceptions about the mind-body problem 
between the groups could be related or could stem from paranormal believers’ general 
tendency to make core knowledge confusions about mental, physical, and biological 
phenomena. This tendency could also explain why dualistic beliefs are related to 
paranormal beliefs that have nothing to do with mind-body relations such as faith 
healing and psychokinesis (Stanovich, 1989; Thalbourne, 1996).  
We used two different studies in Paper IV to test the relations of conceptions about 
the mind-body relations, paranormal beliefs, and core knowledge confusions. Our 
hypothesis was that both implicit (i.e., believing in an immortal soul) and explicit (i.e., 
explicit definitions of mind-body relations) dualistic perceptions about the mind-body 
relationship are related to paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions. In turn, we 
expected that non-dualistic perceptions such as that the mind is dependent on the brain 
functions (emergentism) or that the mind is the same as the brain functions (monism) 
are unrelated or negatively related to paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions. We 
also tested the role of ontological confusions as a preceding factor that explains 
differences in mind-body conceptions and which functions as a unifying background 
variable for the paranormal beliefs. This could explain why paranormal beliefs that have 
nothing to do with mind-body relations are still associated with them (e.g., belief in 
horoscopes and belief in an immortal soul).   
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1.7 Paranormal beliefs and the social brain: Oversensitive 
social information processing? 
 
Another source of individual differences in paranormal beliefs that could be related to 
social information processing, could be the differences in the amount of representations 
the ToM-system generates during spontaneous or deliberate processing. Baron-Cohen 
(1999) has suggested that it may be impossible to understand the idea of paranormal 
agency without properly functioning ToM and in support, Norenzayan, Gervais, and 
Trzesniewski (2012) found out that people with autistic spectrum disorders that have 
mentalizing deficits have fewer beliefs in religious agency such as gods than control 
subjects did. This suggests that at the extreme end of the ToM continuum, that is 
characterized by “mind-blindness,” paranormal beliefs in agency are diminished and a 
well-functioning ToM maybe a prerequisite for some paranormal beliefs. However, 
these results do not address the individual differences along the continuum but only the 
extreme. Thus, the question remains, does a scarce or a strong mentalizing tendency 
lead to scarce or strong paranormal beliefs in general population? 
Although the ToM is considered to be a domain-specific system dedicated to 
understanding intentionally acting agents, people tend to interpret surrounding world's 
events in mental terms, whether they are intentional, random, or mechanical. Usually, 
this is done only in a metaphorical sense without a genuine belief. For example, a storm 
could be observed to be an exceptionally angry storm or a malfunctioning computer can 
be described as being stupid and having maybe even a grudge against the user. In 
cognitive psychology, this tendency to anthropomorphism, treating nature and the 
physical world as human-like or with psychological terms, has been proposed to serve 
as an inductive base of reasoning (Epley, Wayatz, & Cacioppo, 2007; Guthrie, 1993). A 
similar idea, that ToM processing is a "default mode of cognizing," has also been 
suggested in the field of neurosciences based on a different line of research (Schilbach, 
Eickhoff, Rotarska-Jagiela, Fink, & Vogeley, 2008). However, this suggestion does not 
comment on mentalizing non-mental phenomena. Although treating the non-human 
phenomena as human is a common everyday phenomena, it has been suggested that this 
tendency is associated with paranormal beliefs (Guthrie, 1993; Barret, 2000) and indeed, 
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it has been found that paranormal believers believe that a storm has a purpose explicitly 
planned by a supernatural agent (Svedholm, Lindeman, & Lipsanen, 2010). 
In Paper V we tested whether paranormal believers engage more in ToM processing 
when they process randomly moving objects than skeptics do. We utilized fMRI during 
a viewing task of animations with randomly and intentionally moving geometric shapes 
and asked the participants to judge the randomness and intentionality of the animations. 
At the brain level, areas related to interpreting intentional animations and mentalizing in 
general are based on a large network that is functionally specialized to some extent 
(Amodio & Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2003; Gallagher & Frith, 2003; Van Overwalle & 
Baetens, 2009). The network includes superior temporal sulcus (STS) that is activated 
by observing faces and biological motion, temporoparietal junction (TPJ), posterior 
cingulate cortex (PCC), and the ventral medial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). The right 
TPJ, PCC and vmPFC are specially connected to higher level mentalizing about inner 
mental states (see paper V for references). We hypothesized that during the random 
animations, paranormal believers’ mentalizing network is more active than that of 
skeptics.  
The question of specificity of the association of ToM processing, that is, mentalizing 
non-mental, and paranormal beliefs is interesting because earlier studies have found that, 
in general, paranormal believers find more patterns in ambiguous semantic and visual 
stimuli (Brugger et al., 1993; Giannotti, Mohr, Pizzagalli, Lehman, & Brugger, 2001; 
Fyfe, Williams, Mason, Graham, & Pickup 2008; Elk, 2013). Thus, it might be that 
because paranormal believers are generally prone to see patterns-in-noise, this also 
affects their tendency to find meaningful patterns in ambiguous situations whether the 
stimuli is social or not. In social situations it then would not be sensitivity to social 
information per se, but a general tendency to interpret patterns as meaningful even from 
scarce information which then can be interpret in mental terms. However, it could also 
be possible that a general pattern-detection tendency and social cognition enhance each 
other. For example, the bottom-up tendency to find meaningful patterns could lead to 
further mentalizing them with the top-down processes, in a sense that the constantly 
detected patterns call for explanation that tends to be mental among the believers. 
Alternatively, the lower level processing of social related information could be even 
more sensitive than general sensitivity to patterns in any stimuli. 
To further test the association of paranormal beliefs, sensitivity to social information, 
and patter-detection, we used pictures of artifacts and scenery with and without face-
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like patterns in a detection and a rating task in Paper VI. In the study, paranormal 
believers and skeptics were asked to identify and to point to the face-like areas in the 
pictures. Afterwards, they also rated the face-likeness and emotionality of the possible 
face-like areas. We expected that paranormal believers would be more prone to illusory 
face perception (i.e., reporting seeing face-like areas when none exists) and that 
paranormal believers would rate the artifact faces more face-like and emotional than 
skeptics would. 
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2. Aims of the study 
  
This thesis consists of six studies conducted with various methods ranging from self-
report online questionnaires to fMRI imagining. Three different research questions (1-3 
below) were addressed with the studies. The research questions and types of studies of 
each research paper are listed in Table 1. The exact hypothesis of each study can be 
found in the original papers.   
The three main research questions and expectations were:  
1) What are the neural correlations of ontological confusions that are highly 
related to paranormal beliefs? We expected that ontological confusions 
are manifestations of intuitive world knowledge and that to determine the 
literal truth of sentences with ontological violations is more difficult for 
paranormal believers than for skeptics, which in turn, is reflected as a 
more negative N400 effect in an EEG among paranormal believers. 
(Paper I). 
2) Does effective cognitive inhibition downplay paranormal beliefs? We 
expected that good performance in inhibition tests is associated with 
unbelieving and compromised performance with believing. We also 
expected that in skeptics, processing of information that could be 
interpreted in paranormal terms elicits activation in the right IFG that is 
associated with cognitive inhibition. (Papers II and III)   
3) How is the social brain related to paranormal beliefs and is an 
oversensitive theory of mind related to paranormal beliefs? Three 
different expectations were set. First, 3a) we expected that the way 
people understand the mind-body problem contributes to believing and 
unbelieving. Both implicit and explicit dualistic stands were expected to 
be related to paranormal beliefs. Dualistic stands were also expected to 
mediate the relationship between ontological confusions and paranormal 
beliefs. Second, 3b) we expected that paranormal believers, in contrast to 
skeptics, assign more intentions to random moving objects and that this 
is reflected at the brain level as activation of the mentalizing network. 
Third, 3c) we expected that in contrast to skeptics, paranormal believers 
are more prone to illusory face perception. (Papers IV, V, and VI)  
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Table 1. Overview of the studies and research questions  
Paper Research question Participants Methods 
I 1 
10 paranormal believers 
and 10 skeptics 
EEG, N400 ERP 
study 
II 2 
12 Skeptics and 14 
paranormal believers 
Performance in 
inhibition tests 
III 2 
Pilot study: 119 
volunteers 
Online self-report 
  
Main study: 11 
paranormal believers and 
12 skeptics 
  fMRI and a self-
report 
IV 3a Study 1: 850 volunteers Online self-report 
  Study 2: 74 volunteers 
Speeded conditions 
of self-report scales 
V 3b 
11 paranormal believers 
and 12 skeptics 
fMRI and a rating 
task 
VI 3c 47 volunteers 
Perceptual detection 
task and a rating 
task 
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3. Methods  
 
3.1 Participants  
 
The studies consisted of experimental, electrophysiological, neuroimaging and 
correlational studies with a total of 1,182 participants with various educational, 
occupational, and belief backgrounds. Detailed descriptions of each study are presented 
next. 
Paper I was an experimental EEG study conducted with 10 paranormal believers 
(three males, mean age=26 years, range 23-31 years) and 10 skeptics (three males, mean 
age=26 years, range=23-49 years). All participants were right-handed, healthy, and 
native Finnish speakers recruited from an earlier study with 3,261 participants 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Participants were recruited depending on their degree of 
self-reported paranormal beliefs. Participants whose results placed them in the upper- or 
lower 10% of the Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) scores were 
contacted and invited to participate in the follow-up study concerning information 
processing and brain responses. From the people willing to participate, 20 participants 
were randomly selected. The range of paranormal beliefs scores was on a scale 1-5 
(1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree): 1.0-1.1 for the skeptics and 3.1-3.9 for the 
paranormal believers. The study was conducted in an EEG laboratory with the approval 
of the Research Ethics Committee in the Department of Psychology, University of 
Helsinki.   
The study of paper II was conducted with 26 participants recruited from the same 
participant pool as the participants of Paper I. Twelve skeptics (5 females, mean 
age=32.2 years) and 14 paranormal believers (11 females, mean age=34.6 years) took 
part in the study. All participants scored on the highest or lowest 25th percentile on the 
Revised Paranormal Belief Scale (Tobacyk, 2004) measured in the earlier study. Eleven 
of the believers were full-time students, two were employed, and one did not report an 
occupational status. All skeptics were university students and ten of them had 
completed upper-secondary school, one had attended vocational school, and one had 
graduated with a Master's degree. From the believers, 12 had finished upper-secondary 
school, one had attended a polytechnic school, and one had graduated with a Bachelor's 
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degree. The basic education level or years of study for the university students did not 
differ between the skeptics and believers.   
The pilot study of Paper III was used to prepare the stimulus material and its 
participants consisted of 119 volunteers (99 female, 20 male, mean age 27 years, range 
19-48 years) recruited via Internet mailing lists. The pilot study was an online self-
report questionnaire.  
The main study of Paper III and the study of Paper V were fMRI experiments 
conducted with 23 volunteers recruited from an earlier study of representative sample of 
15 to 56-year-old Finns (Lindeman, 2011). Participants were recruited based on their 
paranormal beliefs scores (highest and lowest 10%) on the Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (Tobacyk, 2004). Eleven of the participants were paranormal believers (6 female, 
average age=38, range=23-53 years) and 12 were skeptics (6 female, 5 male, average 
age=34 years, range 21–49 years). All participants were healthy and fulfilled the safety 
requirements for fMRI imagining. The ethics committee of the Hospital District of 
Helsinki and Uusimaa approved the studies.  
Paper IV's study 1 was done as an online self-report with 850 volunteers (59% 
women, 41% men, mean age=30 years, range=16-66 years). Thirty-four percent of the 
participants were university students and 7.3% were other students. Ten percent of the 
university students were psychology students and the second largest group (6%) were 
students of mathematics, while the rest had 20 different subject areas of study. Of the 
participants who were not currently studying, 32.5% were working in 95 different 
occupations, 12.9% were otherwise occupied, and 12.7% were without specified 
occupational status. Educational levels varied from basic education (17.7%) to upper-
secondary level (38.1%) to higher education (32.9%) and not specified (11.3%). 
Religious affiliations of the participants were, Evangelical Lutheran (46.2%), some 
other church (3.2%), no conviction (38.4%), and no answer (12.2%). Various Internet 
mailing lists and message boards were used to recruit the participants.  
Study 2 of Paper IV was an experimental study conducted with 74 participants (41 
women, 33 men, mean age=32 years, range 20-53). Twenty-one of the participants were 
currently university students while 53 were currently working in 34 different 
occupations. Participants were recruited from Internet mailing lists, discussion forums, 
notice boards, and with the snowball method. To obtain participants from both ends of 
the paranormal belief continuum, two different advertisements were used during 
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recruiting: one emphasizing believing in the paranormal and the other, expressing 
skepticism towards the paranormal.   
The study of paper VI was conducted with 47 healthy volunteers with normal or 
corrected to normal vision (26 female, mean age=31 years, range=20-50 years). 
Participants were recruited from the participant group of Study 2 of Paper V if they 
were in the upper or lower quartiles (25%) of scores on the Paranormal Beliefs Scale 
(Tobacyk, 2004).  
 
3.2 Procedures, measurements and stimuli  
 
3.2.1 Paper I 
 
The study of Paper I was an experimental EEG study. The stimuli of the study consisted 
of 210 three-word sentences. Three different types of sentences were used: normal 
sentences (“stars shine on the sky”), anomalous sentences (“stars rust in the sky”), and 
core knowledge violations (“stars live in the sky”). Each group consisted of 70 
sentences and all sentences across the sentence groups had the same structure (first 
subject then predicate). For a more detailed description of the stimulus material, see 
paper I.   
Subjects evaluated each presented sentence (“Is the sentence literally correct?”; 
“yes”, “no”) during EEG measurement in a sound-attenuated room. Each sentence was 
presented in random order, word-by-word. Every word was on the screen for 400ms 
followed by a blank screen for 400ms before the next word was shown. Answers given 
to the question were saved as an explicit measurement of the core knowledge violations 
if they were given in a 1500 ms time window starting after the last word had appeared 
on the screen. Response times for the answers were calculated from the trigger word to 
the subject's response.  
The EEG was recorded with silver/silver chloride electrodes placed at six standard 
recording sites (Fz, F3, F4, Cz, C3, C4, Pz, left and right mastoid) and two EOG-
Channels (HEOG and VEOG). Midline electrodes (Cz and Pz) were chosen for 
statistical analysis, the placement of the ground electrode, and the use of off-line re-
reference of the data to the arithmetic average of the left and right mastoids was done 
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according to the widely used methods of N400 studies (see paper I for references). Data 
were sampled at a rate of 500 Hz and amplified with a .01-40-Hz bandpass filter. 
To test the between-group differences in the EEG signals, the trials were segmented 
into 800ms epochs: 100ms before the target to 700ms after the target onset. The target 
was the predicate in the middle of the sentence. The data were averaged across trials. 
The resulting ERPs were digitally filtered (.5-10-Hz bandbass filter), baseline corrected 
using the average of the 100ms pre-stimulus epoch, computationally re-referenced to the 
average of the mastoids, and cleaned from artifacts (larger than +-75 μV). To 
investigate the N400 effect, the highest negative peak amplitude between 300 and 
500ms of each sentence type were determined from the individuals' ERPs. 
 
3.2.2 Paper II 
 
In the study of Paper II, subjects were tested with the Stroop Color-Word test (Macleod, 
1991, 2005) followed by the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Demakis, 2003). Two trials 
of the Stroop test were used for statistical analysis: color naming from non-word letters 
(XXXX, that were red, green, yellow or blue) and an incongruent trial where the 
participants had to name the words that were written in different colors (e.g., "red" 
printed in blue ink). The time difference between the color naming from non-word trials 
and from incongruent trials was used as a score for the Stroop inhibition that reflects the 
relative slowing down of processing between the tasks.  
The WCST was administered with standard instructions with four stimulus cards and 
128 response cards. The cards depict figures with varying numbers and colors. The 
participants’ task is to sort randomly presented cards from a deck to the stimulus cards' 
three possible dimensions (figure, color, number). The goal of the sorting is to discover 
the unrevealed rule on the basis of feedback given after every try (was the sorting done 
"right" or "wrong"). After ten consecutive right answers the sorting rule changes 
without informing the participant. Thus, the participant has to sort out the new rule 
again by trial and error. The following measures were used for analysis: total errors (all 
wrong answers); non-perseverative errors (random non-perseverative errors); correct 
categories (how many rule-categories out of six were finished), and perseverative 
errors (perseveration tendency).  
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3.2.3 Paper III 
 
Paper III consisted of a pilot study and an fMRI experiment. The pilot study was used to 
test and develop the stimulus material for the main fMRI study. In the pilot study 
participants rated 24 short story-picture pairs. Short stories described critical life 
situations and were paired with sharp color photos of lifeless objects and scenery 
containing no letters, numbers, animals, or people. Participants were given the 
following instruction: ”Imagine you are walking down the street. You are deep in 
thought, thinking about the situation described in the story.  Suddenly, you see a picture 
on a large poster right in front of you. Try to think about what thoughts the picture 
might raise in you in that situation”. For example, a participant would first read an 
example: "You have been unemployed and have finally gotten a job interview. After the 
interview, you are unsure about how it went and anxiously await the employer’s 
decision," followed by a picture of a business suit. Examples of the stimuli can be found 
in Paper III. 
First, the story-picture pairs were rated, regarding how much belief in seeing sign 
there was on a scale from 1-5, where 1=completely disagree to 5=completely agree, "If I 
saw that poster in that situation, I would think that the picture contained a sign or a 
message about how this situation was going to turn out." Second, the subjects rated 
what emotions the pairs elicited on a three-point scale for positive emotions ("Yes, very 
positive" to "Does not raise emotions") and on a corresponding three-point scale for 
negative emotions.  
The results of the pilot study showed that the distribution of the ratings were for most 
pictures bimodal peaking at ‘completely disagree’ and ‘somewhat agree.’ Seeing 
pictures as signs correlated strongly with believing in the supernatural (r=.50, p < 0.001) 
measured with the Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (Tobacyk, 2004). In addition, 
seeing the pictures as signs was related to both positive (r=.51, P < 0.001) and negative 
(r=.55, P < 0.001) emotions.  
In the main study, 30 story-picture pairs were used. These were selected and 
developed based on the pilot study and balanced with respect to emotional valence. The 
study setting was similar to the pilot study, except that it was conducted during fMRI 
scanning. Furthermore the presenting time of the stories and the pictures was controlled, 
and answering to the belief in sign and emotionality was submitted after the imaging. 
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The stories were shown for 7s, the pictures for 5s followed by an 8s pause showing a 
blank screen.   
The fMRI imaging was done using a Signa VH/i 3.0 T scanner (GE Healthcare, 
Chalfont St Giles, UK) with the following parameters: echo time 32 ms, repetition time 
2.0 s, flip angle 758, field of view 22 cm, 34 slices aligned with the line connecting the 
anterior and posterior commissures, slice thickness 4.0 mm and matrix size 64 x 64. In 
the pre-processing state, the functional pictures were realigned, normalized to a 
Montreal Neurological Institute template, and smoothed to enable intersubject 
comparison and to account individual variation in functional anatomy (see paper III for 
details).  
Next, time series were analyzed with a general linear model and box-car functions 
for story, picture, and rest blocks were modeled and convolved with a hemodynamic 
response function. The fMRI data were fitted to the model. Contrast images for each 
participant in each condition (story > rest, picture > rest, and story > picture) were 
calculated to show differences in parameter estimates in each voxel. Individual contrast 
images were then used for group-level analysis.  
The overall activation of the task (picture > rest) was tested with one sample t-test 
with believers and skeptics pooled using family wise error (FWE) correction for 
multiple comparisons to the entire brain volume. Group differences were tested with 
two-sample t-tests. Group differences were tested in two a priori anatomical regions of 
interest (ROI): right inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) based on the cognitive inhibition 
literature (Aron, Robbins, & Poldrack, 2004), and the left IFG ROI based on the earlier 
study regarding interpreting messages (Tylén et al., 2009). The activation in the right 
IFG ROI was used also in the multiple regression analysis with pooled groups to test the 
association of picture > rest contrasts activations and a self-reported variable of seeing 
signs. The results of the ROI analysis were FWE corrected in the volume of ROI. 
 
3.2.4 Paper IV 
 
Study I of Paper IV was conducted as an online self-report. The following measures 
were used. To measure explicit conceptions about the mind-body relationship, a 
modification of Stanovich's (1989) 27-item Dualism scale was used. The original scale 
was simplified, ambiguous items were excluded, and items concerning monism and 
emergentism were added. The new scale had 25 items that were evaluated with a five-
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point scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree). Three factors were identified with a 
factor analysis with a Varimax rotation. Based on the analysis, these factors were named 
reflective dualism (mind and body are qualitatively distinct), emergentism (mind and 
brain are qualitatively different, but interdependent), and monism (mind and body are 
the same or fundamentally united), with reliability estimates (Tarkkonen & Vehkalahti, 
2005) of .87, .82, and .75, respectively.  
Afterlife beliefs, beliefs concerning properties of an immortal soul, in other words 
beliefs about which biological and psychological processes may continue after death, 
were assessed with a scale modified after Bering and Bjorklund (2004, Experiment 3). 
The questions were answered in dichotomous form. For example, "When a person is 
dead, is she or he still able to X" ("yes", "no"). The scale consisted of 22 items 
regarding biological processes (e.g., When a person is dead, is she or he still able to 
eat?); psychobiological processes (e.g., be hungry); perceptual processes (e.g., see); 
desire (e.g., want); emotions (e.g., feel sad), and epistemic processes (e.g., know). The 
afterlife belief variable was the average score of the items (Cronbach’s α=.94).  
Paranormal beliefs were measured using a Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale 
(Tobacyk, 2004, Cronbach’s α=0.92). The scale included 26 five-point items 
(1=completely disagree, 5=completely agree). The scale had seven subscales: witchcraft; 
psi; traditional religious beliefs; superstition; spiritualism; extraordinary life forms, and 
precognition. Example statements used were, “Some psychics can accurately predict the 
future” and “Some individuals are able to levitate (lift) objects through mental forces,”  
Thirty statements of the Core Knowledge Confusions scale (Lindeman & Aarnio, 
2007) were used to measure ontological confusions. In the scale, first, six practice 
sentences were presented and participants were asked to determine if the sentences were 
metaphorically or literally true. The sentences were either clearly literal sentences (e.g., 
"Sibelius was a composer") or metaphorical (e.g., "A surprising piece of news is a 
bombshell") to highlight the difference between metaphorical and literal sentences. The 
scale was dichotomous (1=only metaphorically true, 2=literally true) unlike the original 
5-point scale. The actual 30-item scale consisted of sentences with ontological 
confusions such as "the house knows its history," "a force lives in nature," and "a foot 
wants to move”; four metaphorical and four literal statements were also used to disguise 
the purpose of the scale. The average score of all items was used as an ontological 
confusions variable (Cronbach's α=.88). 
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In Study 2 of Paper IV, participants made speeded versions (answering time was 
restricted to 4s) of the Core Knowledge Confusions scale and afterlife beliefs scale in a 
laboratory setting. Speeded conditions were used to eliminate the possibility of 
engaging in effortful processing so that the subject would instead produce intuitive, 
default responses (Bargh, 1989; Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Wilkowski & Robinson, 
2007). Afterlife beliefs were measured with the same protocol as in Study I except that 
the answering time was not restricted and answers were entered with a joystick. The 
core knowledge confusions scale was slightly modified from Study 1 and there was a 
different answering method. 
Instead of answering whether the ontological confusions were literally true or 
metaphorical as in Study 1, participants were asked to simply answer whether the 
sentences were literally true or not. This answering method was used to highlight the 
importance of the literal truth. In Study 1, it could have been possible that rather than 
answering about literal truth, the participants were judging whether the sentences were 
more metaphorically or literally true. Paranormal beliefs were measured with the 
Revised Paranormal Beliefs Scale (Tobacyk, 2004). 
 
3.2.5 Paper V 
 
Paper V consisted of an fMRI study in which participants watched and rated animation 
videos with four intentionally and four randomly moving animated shapes. Four 
intentional animations depicted short, story-like narratives such as "four children 
playing a tag game." The movement of the shapes was independent; they moved with 
changing speed, were goal-directed, and interacted with others. The shapes also 
"communicated" with reciprocal small, shaking movements. In the four random 
animations, the shapes' movement was unsystematic, not goal-directed, and there was 
no reciprocal action between the objects. All animations lasted 30 seconds.  
One trial consisted of an animation, five questions, and a 20 second rest. Each 
animation was presented twice with two different kinds of instructions. Participants 
were asked to either watch the animations freely or calculate how many times the 
shapes in the animations touched each other or the edges of the screen. Different 
instructions were used as a control task to control the allocation of attention during the 
animations. After each animation, participants were presented three questions about the 
intentionality (e.g., "How intentional was the movement?"), one about the randomness 
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of the movement ("How random was the movement of the shapes?"), and if a control 
task was used, one about the control task ("Did the objects touch each other and the 
walls more than X times?"). If a control task was not present, there was a second 
question concerning randomness. Participants answered with a continuous visual-analog 
scale. Average rating scores for intentionality and randomness were calculated. 
The fMRI acquisition and pre-processing was similar to the main study of Paper III 
and similarly, functional time series were analyzed with a general linear model. Box-car 
functions that were convolved with hemodynamic response functions were calculated 
for the following: intentional animations (IA); intentional animations with the control 
task (IAC); random animations (RA); random animations with the control task (RAC); 
answering intentional questions; answering random questions, and rest blocks. For each 
subject, the following individual contrasts were calculated to test the effects of the 
animation type and control task: intentional > random (IA + IAC - RA - RAC); 
animations with the control-task  > animations without the control-task (-IA + IAC - RA 
+ RAC); the interaction effect of animation type and control task (+IA -IAC - RA + 
RAC); intentional animations > rest (IA + IAC - rest), and random animations > rest 
(RA + RAC - rest). These first-level contrasts were then used in a second level analysis. 
One sample t-tests were used for a group level analysis and two-sample t-tests were 
used for between-group analyses. All results were FWE-corrected for multiple 
comparisons after random field theory either to the whole brain volume or to the 
volume of an ROI.  
ROIs were chosen a priori and were based on a meta-analysis of the mentalizing 
network (Overwalle & Baetens, 2009). The ROIs were: TPJ, mPFC, and PCC. We also 
used a functionally determined ROI of mPFC based on the rating task (intentional 
ratings > random ratings) to identify the areas associated with intention evaluation. The 
rating tasks were orthogonal to the animations activations in the model; thus, they were 
statistically independent, which enabled avoiding "double dipping" (Kriegeskorte, 
Simmons, Bellgowan, & Baker, 2009). "Double dipping" refers to an error of using 
statistically dependent measures when determining ROIs and then testing the activations 
within the same ROIs. Double dipping biases the statistical strength of the activations. 
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3.2.6 Paper VI  
  
Paper VI describes a study with two different tasks. In both tasks, the same stimuli 
material was used: 98 artifact face pictures that had an area that could be interpreted as 
face-like and 87 non-face pictures that had no face-like areas. The stimuli pictures were 
chosen after a pilot study in which the stimulus material was tested on 10 participants 
(see Paper VI for details). Pictures depicted such items and objects as furniture, and 
such places as rooms, buildings, and landscapes. No people or animals were in the 
pictures. Some of the pictures were staged; some were natural. Pictures were kept as 
natural as possible and only their size was altered so that they were all 640 x 640 pixels.  
In task one, the detection task, participants tried to identify face-like areas from the 
185 pictures. The task was performed in a laboratory with a computer. One trial 
consisted of a fixation cross (1000ms), a picture (1000ms), and a response phase 
(4000ms). The response was entered with a mouse on an empty area that was the same 
size as the presented picture. If participants saw a face-like area on the picture, they 
were instructed to point and click the left mouse button on the blank area at the 
approximate place where the face-like area was seen. If no face-like area was detected, 
participants were instructed to press the right mouse button. After the answer or if no 
answer was given during the answering window, the next trial was presented. Variables 
for hit and miss rates for both, artifact and non-artifact faces were calculated. For the 
artifact faces, all left mouse clicks ("Yes, there is a face-like area in the picture") were 
coded as hits if the answer was given in an area that was in the pilot study defined as the 
face-like area. If the area clicked when answering "yes" was outside the previously 
defined face-like area, the answer was coded as yes-miss. All right clicks ("No, there is 
no face-like area") were coded as misses. For the non-face pictures, left mouse clicks 
("yes") were coded as false alarms and right mouse clicks ("yes") as correct rejections. 
For both picture types, non-responses were coded as non-responses (no group 
differences were found in non-responses). The test had good internal consistency: for 
artifact faces, Cronbach's α=.93, and for non-face pictures, Cronbach's α=.98.  
The second task, the rating task, was completed after the detection task. All artifact 
face pictures were presented a second time one by one and the participants were asked 
to rate the face-likeness (Cronbach's α=.98) and emotionality (Cronbach's α=.95) of 
them. Responses were recorded using a visual analog scale presented below the picture. 
The answering time was unrestricted. If participants did not see any face-like area in the 
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picture, they were instructed to press the right mouse button and the answer was coded 
as 0 (not at all face-like or not emotional). 
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4. Results   
  
4.1 Neural foundations of core knowledge confusions  
 
The study of Paper I investigated the neural correlates of ontological violations by 
measuring N400 ERPs during a semantic judgment task of normal sentences, 
anomalous sentences, and sentences with ontological violations. A multivariate analysis 
of variance showed that there was a main effect of group (F (1,18)=2.16, p <.032, 
η2=.231), sentence ( F (2,17)=26.02, p <.001, η2=.754) and electrode (F (2,18)=14.56, 
p <.01, η2=.447).  There was also an interaction effect between the group and the 
sentence (F (2,17)=4.10, p < .035, η2=.325). Regarding the interaction, comparisons 
showed that for core knowledge sentences a more negative N400 effect was found 
among the believers than among the skeptics (p<.05).When comparing the other two 
sentence types, the N400 elicited by the anomalous sentences was more negative than 
that elicited by the normal sentences (p < .001), or the core knowledge sentences (p 
<.001). Between-group differences for anomalies (p=.481) or normal sentences (p 
= .213) were non-significant. The results showed that, as expected, paranormal believers 
had a stronger (more negative) N400 response to the sentences with ontological 
violations than skeptics did.  
The behavioral data showed that there were no group differences in reaction times to 
different sentences. There were also no group differences in the judgment of whether 
the ontological sentences were literally correct or not. 
 
4.2 Cognitive inhibition and paranormal beliefs  
 
In Paper II, the WCST and Stroop test were used to assess inhibition in skeptics and 
paranormal believers. A multivariate analysis of variance was used to test the group 
differences in the four subscales of WCST. The univariate F was significant, 
F(5,20)=3.47, p=0.02, and the results showed that paranormal believers’ performance 
was poorer than skeptics in each of the four scores: total errors, non-perseverative 
errors, perseverative errors, and categories correct. A one way ANOVA was used to 
test the difference between paranormal believers’ (M=307, SD=155) and skeptics’ 
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(M=293ms, SD=142) performance in the Stroop inhibition task. The performance did 
not differ between the groups (p=0.81). 
In Paper III, cognitive inhibition was tested indirectly in an fMRI study and a self-
repot rating task of the story-picture pairs after the imaging. The behavioral results 
showed that interpreting that the picture shown after the story could be interpreted as 
seeing a sign was more common for paranormal believers (M=3.49) than for skeptics 
(M=1.79), F(1,21)=25.92, p < .001, η2=.564. This replicated the finding of the pilot 
study. 
The fMRI analysis showed that the main effect of viewing the pictures (picture > rest) 
with subject groups pooled, elicit activations in the left IFG, middle frontal gyrus, 
fusiform gyrus, middle occipital gyrus, and hippocampus. There was no statistically 
significant activity in the reverse contrast (rest > picture). No group differences were 
found at the whole brain level analysis or at the a priori chosen left IFG ROI. However, 
there was a group difference in the right IFG activation in the picture > rest contrast. 
Skeptics had a stronger activation than supernatural believers in an area covering pars 
orbitalis and pars triangularis (t=5.34, p=< 0.05, FWE corrected, coordinates of the peak 
activation: X=52, Y=22, Z=0). This cluster of activation also overlapped with an 
activation cluster of picture > rest contrast when the ratings of seeing signs was used as 
a covariate in the analysis (t=4.73, p < .05, FWE corrected; coordinates of the peak 
activation x=36, y=18, z=-10). To sum up, on average, skeptics had a stronger 
activation in the right IFG than paranormal believers did and when groups were 
combined, the more there was right IFG activation, the fewer were the self-reports of 
seeing signs in the pictures.   
 
4.3 Social brain and paranormal beliefs  
 
4.3.1 Mind-body conceptions, ontological confusions, and paranormal 
beliefs 
 
Paper IV's Studies 1 and 2 tested the association of implicit and explicit mind-body 
conceptions, ontological confusions, and paranormal beliefs. The self-report Study 1 
found that emergentism (M=3.34) was the most preferred stance on the mind-body 
problem, followed by monism (M=3.09, t(761)=3.74, p < .001) and reflective dualism 
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(M=2.61, t(762)=-22.68, p < .001). Reflective dualism was positively associated and 
monism negatively associated with afterlife beliefs (r=.50, p < .001; r=-.32, p < .001, 
respectively), with paranormal beliefs (r=.70, p < .001; r=-.33, p < .001, respectively), 
and with ontological confusions (r=.54, p < .001; r=-.14, p < .001, respectively). 
Emergentism was only slightly associated with afterlife beliefs (r=.15, p=< .01) and 
paranormal beliefs (r=.17, p=< .001), and not with ontological confusions (r=.06, non-
significant). 
Multiple regression analysis was conducted to test whether reflective dualism and 
afterlife beliefs mediate the relationship between ontological confusions and religiosity 
and paranormal beliefs. The claim received support regarding partial mediation that was 
tested with Sobel's (1982) test. The effect was significant (p=.001) in both analysis: 
ontological confusion–reflective dualism–paranormal beliefs, Z=12.92, and ontological 
confusion–afterlife beliefs–paranormal beliefs, Z=8.95. 
We tried also to replicate the findings of Study 1 in Study 2 using implicit measures 
of ontological confusions and afterlife beliefs. The findings of Study 1 were replicated: 
a significant indirect effect of implicit ontological confusions via afterlife beliefs to 
paranormal beliefs was found (β=1.57, with a bias corrected confidence interval [0.88, 
2.20]). There was also a direct effect from implicit ontological confusions to paranormal 
beliefs. The tested model explained 77.8% of the variance of paranormal beliefs, F(2, 
69)=120.88, p < .001. Because the sample size in Study 2 was small and the distribution 
of paranormal beliefs was skewed, the regression analysis was done with 1,500 
bootstrapped resamples (Bollen & Stine, 1990; Shrout & Bolger, 2002) to achieve 
reliable estimates for the mediation effects. 
 
4.3.2 Attribution of intention to randomly moving objects  
 
In Paper V, we used fMRI to measure brain activations of paranormal believers while 
they watched randomly and intentionally moving animations. Groups were analyzed 
separately and then compared with each other. Watching the intentional animations in 
contrast to rest (intentional animations > rest) revealed typical activations related to 
watching animations with intentional content. For both groups, there were activations of 
TPJ, STG, and occipital visual areas together with parietal areas and middle temporal 
gyrus. For skeptics, there was also activation in the middle and inferior frontal gyri. The 
random animations > rest contrast revealed similar activations as when watching 
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intentional animations except that the activation of TPJ, typically associated with 
intentional animations, was missing. There were no group differences in either contrast 
when groups were compared. No interaction effects between the animation type and 
control task were found.  
For skeptics, the intentional animations > random animations contrast produced 
activations in bilateral TPJs, ventral mPFC (vmPFC), and the post-central gyrus/inferior 
parietal lobule. In paranormal believers, activation differences were found bilaterally in 
the middle and inferior occipital gyri and in the left TPJ. Thus, the typical activation of 
right TPJ and mPFC to intentional animations was missing in believers but this was due 
the similarity of the activations to the random and intentional animations. No group 
differences were found in the direct comparison (intentional animations > random 
animations). However, in the reverse contrast (random animation > intentional 
animation) paranormal believers had stronger activation in vmPFC than skeptics. This 
activation difference was significant corrected for the multiple comparisons to the 
whole brain volume, to the a priori ROI and to the functional ROI. Thus, the area that 
was more strongly activated in paranormal believers than in skeptics while they watched 
random animations was the same area associated in literature to mentalizing and that 
was activated during the rating task of how intentionally behaving the animations were 
in contrast to how randomly moving the animations were.   
 
4.2.3 Illusory face-perception  
 
The results from Paper VI were analyzed using signal detection analysis (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Macmillan & Creelman, 2005) that enabled correction of the hit-rate with 
the false-alarm rate, revealing actual detection sensitivity. Two variables were 
calculated: perceptual sensitivity (d') and bias towards answering "yes" in both 
conditions (criterion C). Paranormal believers had more false alarms in non-face 
pictures, F (1,36)=7.95, p=.008, η2=.181, and more hits in the predetermined face-areas, 
F(1,36)=9.99, p=.003, η2=.217, than skeptics. The perceptual sensitivity d' did not 
differ between the groups but the criterion C differed. Skeptics (M=0.67, SD=0.39) had 
a higher criterion C than paranormal believers (M=0.43, SD=0.34), F(1, 36)=11.02, 
p=.002, η2=.234). Thus, the believers both found more face-like areas, but also had 
more false alarms.  
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We also tested whether the paranormal believers found the predetermined face-like 
areas better than the skeptics. Analysis of covariance was conducted with the number of 
correct location identifications divided by the sum of correct and incorrect location 
identifications for all trials where participants had reported a face-like area as a 
dependent variable. Paranormal believers found more face-like areas (M=90) than 
skeptics did (M=87), F(1,36)=6.01, p=.019, η2=.143. In the rating task, paranormal 
believers (M=110 SD=50) rated the face-like pictures more face-like than skeptics 
(M=72, SD=44), F(1,37)=6.25, p=0.17, η2=.145) and more emotional than skeptics 
(believers: M=54, SD=18, skeptics M=42, SD=14), F(1,37)=4.70, p=.037, η2=.113.
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5. Discussion 
 
5.1 Core knowledge confusions reflect intuitive differences in 
world knowledge 
 
In Paper 1, we sought verification of the conceptual definition that paranormal beliefs 
stem from looseness of intuitive core knowledge and tried to gain insight into their 
neural basis. The results showed that when compared to skeptics, paranormal believers 
had a more negative N400 effect on sentences with ontological confusions. There were 
no differences between the groups in normal or anomalous sentences. This implies that 
what differentiated the believers from the skeptics was not the way they understood 
literally true sentences or anomalous sentences, but that they had difficulty in 
determining the literal truth of sentences with core knowledge violations. The N400 
effect has been proposed to reflect long-term memory retrieval of world knowledge 
(Chwilla & Kolk, 2005; Federmeier et al., 2002; Hagoort et al., 2004; Kutas & 
Federmeier, 2011). Hence, the results suggest that for paranormal believers, the intuitive 
core knowledge is less categorized than for skeptics. Core knowledge confusions are 
common in childhood (e.g., Kelemen, 1999; 2004; Bloom & Weisberg, 2007) and may 
decline with age. The results suggest that if the categories remain loose later in life, 
paranormal beliefs that hold violations of core knowledge are readily comprehensible in 
adulthood. These results support the conceptualization of paranormal, superstitious, 
magical, and supernatural beliefs as similar phenomena stemming from core knowledge 
violations (Lindeman & Svedholm, 2012).   
The number of corrects answers in the task did not differ between paranormal 
believers and skeptics. In other words, both groups were able to decide correctly, which 
sentences were literally true and which were not. Other studies, including paper IV of 
this thesis, that have been conducted with significantly larger participant groups have 
found differences in the correct answers between skeptics and paranormal believers 
(Lindeman & Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Svedholm, Lindeman, & 
Lipsanen, 2010; Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013). One possible explanation for this 
contradicting result is the small sample size. Another is that other studies have been 
primarily conducted as internet questionnaires, while the current study was done in a 
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psychology departments' EEG laboratory. The EEG laboratory setting may have 
propped up a scientific way of answering. 
The N400 effect is considered to reflect unconscious processing of semantic 
information and a host of studies show that intuitive conceptions, including core 
knowledge confusions, often co-exist with later learned scientific conceptions (e.g., 
Kelemen & Rosset, 2009; Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012, Svedholm & Lindeman, 2013b). 
If the discrepancy of the explicit answering and the N400 effect are further contrasted, 
the results can also be interpreted in a way that paranormal believers possess the same 
explicit knowledge as skeptics, reflected in right answers, but due to their loose 
categorical distinctions of core knowledge, the N400 was more negative. This 
interpretation also augments the understanding of the robust findings that trust in 
intuition and intuitive thinking in general is associated with paranormal beliefs (e.g., 
Epstein et al., 1996; King et al., 2007; Lindeman & Aarnio, 2006). Because paranormal 
believers' intuitive world knowledge is less strict, and if they trust more in their 
intuitions than skeptics, they are prone to accept ontological confusions rather than rely 
on learned knowledge that challenges the confused intuitions. 
 
5.2 Strong cognitive inhibition dilutes paranormal beliefs 
 
Paper II addressed the relation of cognitive inhibition and paranormal beliefs by 
measuring cognitive inhibition with two tests. The results supported the idea that if 
cognitive inhibition is weaker, paranormal beliefs are more common. When their 
responses were measured with WSCT, paranormal believers and skeptics differed in all 
types of errors, including perseverative errors that have most often been associated with 
inhibition problems (Demakis, 2003). This suggests that well-functioning inhibition 
contributes to disbelief. Because paranormal believers had generally worse success in 
the WSCT, the result may hint about other possible differences in other executive 
functions as well, for example regarding the ability to shift mental sets, an ability also 
needed in WSCT (Greve et al., 2005). However, because the specificity and factorial 
structure of WSCT is unclear (Dillon & Pizzagalli, 2007; Friedman & Miyake, 2004; 
Greve et al., 2005; Miyake et al., 2000; Nigg, 2000; Ray, 2004), diverse methods should 
be used to assess possible associations of cognitive inhibition, executive functions, and 
paranormal beliefs in the future. For example, better analysis of the relation of conflict 
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detection and cognitive inhibition could be fruitful because they are both associated 
with paranormal beliefs (Pennycook, Cheyne, Barr, Koehler, & Fugelsang, 2013).  
We also measured group differences using the Stroop test (Macleod, 2001, 2005) and 
found no differences between paranormal believers and skeptics. Earlier studies have 
found that weaker performance in the Stroop is related to teleological biases (Kelemen 
& Rosset, 2009) and ontological confusions, but not to paranormal beliefs (Svedholm & 
Lindeman, 2013a). Our result together with these findings suggests that the inhibition, 
when measured with Stroop, is not directly associated with paranormal beliefs, but may 
be indirectly related to paranormal beliefs, because the weak cognitive inhibition 
enhances ontological confusions that contribute to paranormal beliefs.  
Still, the results from the Stroop test and WSCT can be seen as contradicting. One 
possible explanation for this potential discrepancy is that cognitive inhibition is a 
complex concept that lacks clear definition, is hard to measure, and may refer to several 
related but distinct concepts or processes (Aron et al., 2004; Aron, 2007; Friedman & 
Miyake, 2004; Lustig et al., 2007). Thus, it is not certain that the Stroop and WSCT 
even capture the same cognitive processes.  
In Paper III we further investigated the possible role of cognitive inhibition in 
paranormal beliefs. We utilized an fMRI imagining during a task in which a story and a 
picture pair formed an association that lured a paranormal explanation. The fMRI 
results showed that for skeptics, the activation of right IFG was stronger than for 
paranormal believers during the task. The behavioral results showed that believers 
interpreted the pictures more often as signs than skeptics, and, importantly, when groups 
were pooled, the average of reporting seeing signs in the picture was negatively 
associated with the right IFG activation strengths. In other words, regardless of subject 
group, the more the right IFG was activated during the task, the fewer paranormal 
interpretations regarding signs were made.  
The right IFG activation has been associated with cognitive inhibition in several 
studies (Aron et al., 2004; De Neys et al., 2008; Goel & Dolan, 2003; Tsujii & 
Watanabe, 2010) and with automatic conflict resolution in the case of cognitive 
dissonance (Jarcho, Berkman, & Lieberman, 2011). It is also associated with conflict 
detection in syllogistic reasoning tasks if the world knowledge and logical answers are 
inconsistent (Goel, 2007; Stollstroff, Vartian, & Goel, 2012). These findings support the 
suggestions that the activations that correlated with non-paranormal interpretations 
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could reflect cognitive inhibition or a similar process that is involved in successful 
resolution of reasoning conflicts.   
It should be noted, however, that only the outcome of the behavioral task that was 
done after the imaging and the activation during the task done in the scanner were 
assessed and there was no direct measurement of cognitive inhibition during the 
imaging. This leads to a risk of reverse inference (Poldrack, 2006) in the interpretation 
of the cognitive nature of the found right IFG activation. Reverse inference means that 
we cannot know the psychological content of an activation without direct decoupling of 
the cognitive measurement representing change in the process and the activation change 
of the fMRI signal. This was even more of a risk in the case of the present study, as 
there was no simple, direct way of measuring cognitive inhibition. 
Although right IFG has been found to be associated with inhibitory processing in 
numerous studies, the exact role of the right IFG in inhibition, attention control, or 
suppression of thoughts is unclear and currently the subject of debate (see for example 
Aron, 2007; 2011; Hampshire et al., 2010; Munakata et al., 2011). It may be that what is 
considered as inhibition at the behavioral or psychological level, may not be inhibition 
of irrelevant information at the brain level, but rather enhancement of task relevant 
information (Egner & Hirsch, 2005). Thus, the concept of inhibition at the 
psychological level (ability to suppress or reject thought processes) may be 
mechanically different at the brain level (there is not a network in the brain that 
suppresses another network). In other words, it is currently better known in which kinds 
of tasks the right IFG is activated, for example, suppression of thoughts and response 
inhibition, than to what exact underlying psychological process it is related.  
Taken together, the results of Papers II and III support the idea that cognitive 
inhibition or related cognitive control mechanisms, functions as a regulator of conflicts 
between intuitive and analytic thinking by downplaying intuitive biases associated with 
paranormal beliefs. Hood (2009) has proposed that paranormal beliefs may be latent and 
that they can re-emerge when inhibition is compromised. Thus, effective regulation of 
intuitions has an important role in disbelieving. 
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5.3 Dualistic conceptions about the mind-body problem are 
strongly associated with paranormal beliefs and are forms of 
ontological confusions  
 
The two studies of Paper IV explored how intuitive and explicit conceptions of the 
mind-body problem are related to paranormal beliefs. In other words, we explored how 
perceptions of how the mind and the body (the brain) are connected are related to 
believing and unbelieving. The results showed that if the mind was seen dualistically as 
independent from the body, paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions were 
common and the implicit and explicit dualistic mind-body conceptions went hand in 
hand. In contrast, monism, the opposite view, that the mind and the body are the same, 
was negatively associated with the paranormal beliefs and ontological confusions. In 
line, the view in the middle, the emergentistic view that the mind is qualitatively 
different from the body but still interdependent of it, was only slightly associated with 
paranormal beliefs and not at all with ontological confusions.  
We also tested the idea that the separating factor between paranormal believers’ and 
skeptics’ mind-body conceptions stems from ontological confusions. The tested model 
explained paranormal beliefs well (coefficient of determination being between .54-.78) 
suggesting that dualism, whether implicit or explicit, is an important stepping-stone to 
paranormal beliefs. This model, where general ontological confusions precede dualistic 
conceptions, can also explain why dualistic views are related to paranormal beliefs that 
have nothing to do with the mind-body problem, such as the belief in protective amulets. 
These results also suggest that in adults, it is not only the ability to think about mind and 
body in different terms that exposes them to belief in souls or spirits (Bering, 2006; 
Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bloom; 2004), but also the tendency to mix up fundamental 
categorical properties of mental, physical, and biological phenomena. This is a bias to 
which some are more inclined than others.  
Afterlife beliefs or belief in an immortal soul, that were measured as intuitive 
dualistic conceptions, are suggested to emerge early in life and they are proposed to be 
naturally emerging and universal, which makes belief in an immortal soul and gods 
readily adoptable (Bering & Bjorklund, 2004; Bering, 2006; Bloom, 2007). Paper III 
shows that if this is true, the ones who hold on to these early emerging beliefs have 
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more loose ontological categorical knowledge in adulthood than people who abandon 
dualistic conceptions. In other words, abandoning dualistic conceptions is associated 
with disbelief and integrated core knowledge. Why these changes happen to some and 
not to others can only be a matter of speculation, based on the current studies. 
The factors contributing to the different trajectories of core knowledge development 
should be investigated more closely in the future. It could be possible that not only does 
loose core knowledge make beliefs more adoptable, but also that beliefs adopted when 
young or growing up in an environment that fosters these beliefs affect the development 
trajectory of core knowledge. The relation of beliefs and core knowledge is probably 
bidirectional. Understanding how core knowledge and especially core knowledge about 
the mind develops is important because mind-body conceptions have practical 
implications. For example, seeing mental illness as "all in the mind" may expose an ill-
founded distinction between mental and physical illness that may affect professional 
decision making of judges and doctors (Kendel, 2001; Gray, Knickman, & Wegner, 
2011). In addition, mind-body conceptions are considered to be important in 
psychologists' and doctors' diagnoses and treatment choices (Fahrenber & Cheetman, 
2000, 2007). Thus, we should know better how mind-body conceptions develop and 
how they affect professionals’ decision making that bears ethical consequences.  
 
5.4 Paranormal believers attribute intentionality to randomness 
and this is associated with activation of the mentalizing 
network  
 
Paper V tested the possibility that because the ToM-processing is considered to be a 
continuum and paranormal beliefs are associated with ToM processing, stronger 
mentalizing is associated with stronger paranormal beliefs. In the study, fMRI signal 
changes were measured while the participants watched intentional and random 
animations. The results showed that there were no group differences between skeptics 
and paranormal believers when they watched intentional animations, but that there was 
difference when they watched randomly moving animations.  
In paranormal believers, the activation of vmPFC, that is part of the mentalizing 
network, was more active during viewing of random animations than in skeptics. The 
believers also rated the random animations as more intentional than skeptics did. These 
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findings are in line with the notions that paranormal beliefs may derive from the ToM-
processing (e.g., Barrett, 2000; Bloom, 2007; Boyer, 2001, 2003; Guthrie, 1993; Hood, 
2009; Kapogiannis, 2009; Kelemen, 1999). However, because the differences were not 
in the intentional animations, but in the random animation, it may be that the ToM 
processing functions as a base for paranormal beliefs only if it is generalized to 
interpreting non-mental phenomena. The finding that skeptics had no problems 
interpreting the intentional animations in intentional terms especially supports this 
interpretation. Similar findings have been obtained in semantic tasks (Lindeman & 
Aarnio, 2007; Lindeman & Saher, 2007; Norenzayan, et al., 2008; Svedholm, et al., 
2010) in which paranormal believers more than skeptics described natural and physical 
phenomena in more intentional terms as in the sample phrase, ‘The volcano is angry.’ 
The present results broaden this view by showing that at least when interpreting 
animations, these over-generalization are related to activation of the mentalizing 
network at the brain level.  
The ToM-network is a large network and functionally specialized to some extent. 
The vmPFC, where the clear activation difference between the groups was found, is 
associated with deliberate mentalizing and interpreting higher order intentions (Amodio 
& Frith, 2006; Frith & Frith, 2006; see also Gobbini et al., 2007). This area is active not 
only when there is a proper mental stimuli present that subjects try to interpret, but also 
when they try to determine if something is intentional in the first place, especially if 
they believe that the stimuli was made by an intentional agent (Steinbeis & Koelsch, 
2009). Thus, the activation difference in vmPFC could reflect deliberate attention of 
trying to find intentions from the random movement in the believers group. If so, the 
results could be interpreted in such a way that paranormal believers are more persistent 
than skeptics in trying to find mental content in ambiguous situations. Nevertheless, 
because paranormal believers rated the random animations as more intentional than 
skeptics did, the possible persistent search was prolific.  
 
5.5 Paranormal believers are more prone to illusory face 
perception than skeptics 
 
In Paper VI, we tested differences between paranormal believers and skeptics when they 
tried to detect face-like features in artifacts and scenery, with and without such features. 
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The results showed that paranormal believers were more prone to illusory face 
perception than skeptics were when pictures with and without face-like features were 
used in the analysis. In other words, paranormal believers reported seeing faces even 
when no proper stimuli were present. This finding is in line with earlier studies that 
have found that paranormal believers are sensitive to find “patterns in noise” with 
various kinds of stimuli and conditions (Brugger et al., 1993; Giannotti, et al., 2001; 
Fyfe, Williams, Mason, Graham, & Pickup 2008; Elk, 2013; Wiseman & Watt, 2006). 
Interestingly, however, because we also asked participants to point to the face-like 
areas in the pictures if they were perceived, we found that when a face-like area was 
presented, paranormal believers were more accurate than skeptics in pointing to it in the 
picture. Thus, even though paranormal believers were prone to illusory face perception, 
they were also better at spotting the faces if, but only if, face-like features were actually 
present. This could imply that the believers could have fewer criteria for what 
constitutes "face-like" than skeptics do. Some of the artifact face pictures were rather 
abstract; thus, if skeptics had a higher criterion on how much face-likeness is needed for 
something to constitute as face-like, it would not be surprising that they were not as 
good as believers in the detection task. Along similar lines, illusory agency detection 
has been found in paranormal believers (Elk, 2013), but only if the ambiguity of the 
stimuli was not too high. The interpretation that less information is needed for 
paranormal believers than for skeptics to trigger a perception, is supported by the results 
of the rating task where believers rated the artifact face pictures as both more emotional 
and more face-like than skeptics. The results from the rating task also highlight the 
common theme carrying through the present studies: paranormal believers tend to relate 
to a non-mental world in mental terms.  
 
5.6 Limitations of the study 
 
In one of the studies we used EEG and in two fMRI. These techniques offer unique 
opportunities to assess cognitive processes, but they also have limitations. For example, 
lately the power of brain imaging studies has been questioned due to analysis methods 
and because of the small number of participants used in the studies (Button et al., 2013). 
Thus, replications with a larger number of participants are needed. Furthermore, in 
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Paper II, where cognitive inhibition was directly assessed, the number of participants 
could have been higher.  
The fMRI method has some other limitations that should be addressed. Pinpointing 
specific areas, such as vmPFC in Paper V and rIFG in Paper III and interpreting the 
activation as mentalizing or cognitive inhibition has its problems. This is because 
activation in one anatomical area rarely equals to cognitive function, and cognitive 
functions are usually supported by large networks (Logothesis, 2008). Thus, even 
though the activation location could be critical or “most active” related to the cognitive 
function in question, there may be other important parts of the network that are missed 
simply because it is assumed that signal change in the fMRI is linearly related to 
strength or importance of cognitive processing.  
The representativeness of the data regarding the ends of the paranormal beliefs 
continuum was relatively good in Papers I, II, III, and V because the participants were 
chosen from a larger participant pool based on their self-rated paranormal beliefs. In 
papers IV and VI, many of the participants were university students, which may have 
had an effect on the skepticism, because Finnish university students are among the most 
skeptical populations used in studies (Tobacyk & Pirttilä-Backman, 1992). Furthermore, 
matching and controlling of the demographic and cognitive factors of the skeptics and 
the paranormal believers in papers where the groups were compared could have been 
done better. In the current studies the focus was on the paranormal beliefs continuum 
and better controlling of cognitive factors, for example intelligence or education, could 
have provided more univocal interpretation of the results.  
It should also be noted that using groups from the ends of the paranormal beliefs 
continuum has pros and cons. Using subjects from the ends of the continuum makes the 
effects clearer than using subjects from more heterogeneous groups. However, it also 
means that the effects’ strengths in the middle of the paranormal belief continuum are 
not directly addressed. In other words, the data only show how strongly the ends of the 
continuum differ, but not how much the people in the middle or along the continuum, 
differ from the ends. Another advantage of testing the ends of the continuum is that, as 
discussed in the introduction, cultural learning and contextual factors have clear effects 
on paranormal beliefs. It could be speculated that in the middle of the continuum 
individual cognitive factors and cultural factors are more mixed as the individual 
differences are less strong and guide the behavior less. The micro and macro cultural 
effects’ interaction with individual differences in cognition should be more vigorously 
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addressed in the future. This is even more so because there is some evidence that the 
shared environment effect decreases with age regarding religiousness in twin studies 
(Bouchard, 2004). Although religiousness is not the same as paranormal beliefs, this 
finding hints at the possibility that the individual differences in cognition become even 
more meaningful with age.  
 
5.7 Conclusions 
 
Paranormal believers have been found to be more prone to ontological confusions than 
skeptics as also found in the present study. Thus, it seems that diverse developmental 
trajectories of core knowledge affects believing and unbelieving. This link was 
especially strong regarding the core knowledge confusions about mind and mental 
processes. Another important conclusion from the present studies is that although these 
confusions are found to diminish in adulthood, when compared to childhood, there is 
still a large variation among adults and this variation goes hand in hand with believing 
and unbelieving. 
The results concerning cognitive inhibition suggest that efficient cognitive control 
mechanisms may work as a buffer against intuitively alluring paranormal beliefs by 
enabling critical and versatile reasoning. A similar mechanism could also work on a 
perceptual level, as in the case of illusory face perception, in a way that although 
someone could be prone to illusory face perception, the automatically triggered 
perceptions are effectively rejected once found meaningless. A simple example of this 
relation in everyday life could be situations that occur when a person hears or sees 
something and notices that the percept was biased. If cognitive inhibition, or a similar 
process, would not work, we would be prone to hold on to these percepts or to try to 
find explanations for them, instead of declaring them as accidental quirks and moving 
on. This effect could get enhanced if it is combined with tendency to mentalize non-
mental phenomena and weakly categorized core knowledge.   
This thesis also sheds light on the relation of the social brain and paranormal beliefs. 
The ability to form mental representations of the mind may indeed function as a base for 
many paranormal beliefs, but to set the believers apart from skeptics, the mentalizing 
processes have to be also used outside the psychological domain to make inferences 
about the non-mental in mental terms not only metaphorically but literally. This is 
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because non-believers can also understand the mind and may misattribute intentions. 
For example, even skeptics may treat badly or shout at a badly functioning computer as 
if it was an intentional creature. Thus, the relationship of the social brain and 
paranormal beliefs is more complex than what is often suggested and the individual 
differences need to be considered to fully understand what contributes to believing and 
unbelieving. Logically cultural knowledge has important effects on shaping these 
interpretations about mental beings and processes. For example, without the cumulating 
scientific evidence and knowledge about what the mind and its functions are it would be 
significantly more difficult to challenge a person’s dualistic intuitions.  
The complex picture of the link between believing and unbelieving and social 
information processing individual differences is also evident if we consider at which 
level of processing the individual differences function. The results from the fMRI study 
with intentional and random animations suggest that the differences are on the 
mentalizing level, a top-down processing of interpreting the stimuli. However, the study 
regarding illusory face-perception suggests that the differences are related to a lower 
criterion value of what can be held as face-like or how many emotions can be seen in an 
artifact face. In other words, it might be that although paranormal believers are prone to 
answer “yes” in any condition, as found, less information is needed at least in some, 
maybe social, situations to trigger the perception of the target stimuli. Naturally, this 
leads to better performance if ambiguous stimuli are present. This suggestion is 
supported by the finding that paranormal believers are more prone to illusory agency 
detection than skeptics, but only if the stimuli are not too noisy (Elk, 2013). Thus, it 
may be that the systems of agency detection and face detection are less picky in 
paranormal believers than in skeptics and at the same time the rising percepts go 
through more thorough mentalizing in paranormal believers than skeptics. To sum up 
the studies, paranormal believers could be sensitive to social information in two ways: 
at the perceptional level and at the top-down level of mentalizing.  
Everyone does mentalize the non-mental, but what seems to set believers apart from 
skeptics is that this mentalizing is not taken as metaphorical, but as real. The ability to 
mentalize the non-mental probably has tremendous effects on people’s ability to 
understand the surrounding world and their imagination and creativity. The author Terry 
Pratchett has written, "The truth may be out there, but the lies are inside your head.” 
Maybe one important difference between believing and unbelieving lies in the ability to 
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not believe too literally the lies the mind sometimes produces when trying to make 
sense of the world, or, in the difference of not to taking these ideas too seriously. 
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